An Employee In Illinois Cannot Bring A Claim For Retaliatory Discharge Based On Employer's Refusal To Renew A Fixed-Term Employment Contract
October, 2006
In Krum v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., 365 Ill. App. 3d 785, 851 N.E.2d 621 (1st Dist. 2006), the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, held that an employee could not maintain a retaliatory discharge claim against an employer for its refusal to renew a fixed-term employment contract.
Facts
Plaintiff worked as an assistant athletic trainer for defendant from 2001 through 2004, and was licensed pursuant to the Illinois Athletic Trainers Practice Act (“the Act”). Defendant’s head athletic trainer was not licensed under this Act. In August 2004, plaintiff advised defendant’s general manager “of numerous improper events that had occurred during the course of the athletic trainers’ duties, including the head athletic trainer’s failure to have a license pursuant to the Athletic Trainers Practice Act.” On or about October 13, 2004, defendant “terminated” plaintiff, but continued to pay him his salary, pursuant to the terms of his employment contract, until December 17, 2004, the date the contract expired.
Plaintiff sued defendant for wrongful discharge, alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for informing defendant’s general manager that defendant’s head athletic trainer was not licensed under the Act. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim was preempted by the Illinois Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174/1 (West 2004)), and that based on his pleadings, plaintiff was unable to maintain a cause of action against defendants pursuant to the Whistleblower Act. The court also noted that even if plaintiff’s claims were not preempted by the Whistleblower Act, his complaint would still be dismissed because he could not meet the elements necessary to maintain a retaliatory discharge claim under Illinois law. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the failure to renew his employment contract did constitute a “discharge,” and that his cause of action was not preempted by the Whistleblower Act.
Analysis
In its decision, the appellate court first noted that: “[t]o state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must plead the following elements: (1) that he or she has been discharged; (2) in retaliation for his or her activities; and (3) that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. Stebbings v. The University of Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 3d 360, 365, 244 Ill. Dec. 825, 726 N.E. 2d 1136 (1st Dist. 2000).” The court went on to discuss how the common law tort of retaliatory discharge is a very narrow exception to the Illinois doctrine of “at-will employment,” which means that an employment relationship can be terminated by either party “at-will” in the absence of an employment contract or agreement which specifies otherwise. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596 (1st Dist. 1982). Based on this well-established Illinois precedent, the court observed that it was “constrained to interpret the elements of the retaliatory discharge cause of action narrowly.”
In support of his argument on appeal, plaintiff cited several cases recognizing retaliatory discharge actions based on an employer’s refusal to recall or rehire an employee. However, the court noted that all of the retaliatory discharge claims in these cases were brought pursuant to various statutes that contained language prohibiting retaliatory failure to recall or rehire. For example, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act prohibits retaliatory action against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim (820 ILCS 310/4(h) (West 2004)).
The Athletic Trainers Practice Act, on the other hand, which is the statute upon which plaintiff’s suit was brought, does not contain any provisions prohibiting retaliatory employment conduct. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff had not pled any statutory language which could support his retaliatory discharge claim. In affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, the court reasoned that since Illinois case law “has consistently sought to restrict the common law tort of retaliatory discharge... absent a statutory basis, contractual employees, such as [plaintiff], cannot bring a claim of retaliatory discharge when employers fail to renew an employment contract.” In other words, plaintiff was unable to satisfy the “discharge” element of the tort of retaliatory discharge. Given its ruling on this particular issue, the court found it unnecessary to examine whether the Whistleblower Act preempted plaintiff’s claims.
Learning Point:
Krum reinforces prior Illinois case law that has repeatedly refused to enlarge the scope of the tort of retaliatory discharge. Although this decision is positive for employers, it is critical that they be aware of all the elements of this tort. Familiarity with these elements will assist an employer in understanding how to terminate an employee without violating Illinois law. This should, in turn, reduce the likelihood of retaliatory discharge claims being brought by former employees.
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