Rejecting Well-Established Maritime Law Precedent, Illinois Supreme Court Holds That Defendant May Demand Jury Trial in Jones Act Case
February, 2006
by Kimbley A. Kearney and
Facts
In Bowman v. Am. River Transp. Co., 838 N.E.2d 949, 2005 AMC 2584 (Ill. 2005), plaintiff filed suit in Illinois state court for injuries suffered while working as a deckhand for defendant. Plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. App. § 688), unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. Defendant filed a timely request for a jury trial, which was stricken on plaintiff’s motion brought on the ground that only the plaintiff in a Jones Act case may demand a jury trial -- not the defendant. The appellate court affirmed.
Analysis
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding “that neither the language of the Jones Act, nor case law interpreting it, nor Illinois law prevent a defendant in a common law action under that statute to demand a jury trial in this state.” at 838 N.E.2d at 961.
The Court reached its conclusion by reviewing the statutory construction of the Jones Act section at issue:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury. (46 U.S.C. App. § 688(a))
Adopting the analysis of Hutton v. Consolidated Grain & Barge Co., 341 Ill. App. 3d 401 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2003), the Court held “that ‘the election’ referred to in the Jones Act is not the seaman’s election of a trial by jury, but his election to proceed ‘at law’ rather than in admiralty.” The Court reasoned from this that the plaintiff controls his choice between a bench or jury trial by electing between bringing his case in admiralty (where neither party is entitled to a jury trial) or in State court. “Thus, having the power to control the forum, the Jones Act plaintiff starts out with full control over whether the case will be tried to a jury.” Once the election is made to proceed in State court, however, the Court concluded that plaintiff is not entitled to restrict a defendant’s right to trial by jury where that right is recognized by state constitution.
In so holding, the Bowman court recognized that its decision, and that in Hutton, “is contrary to the overwhelming weight of both federal and Illinois case law.” 838 N.E.2d at 957; see Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1986). The Court rejected the proposition that, in a case falling within admiralty jurisdiction, a state court must apply federal court decisions on issues of maritime law. Without considering federal authority to the contrary (see e.g. Southern Pacific Ry. Co. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)), or the Admiralty Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction” fall to the judicial power of the United States), the Bowman court concluded that, while it is bound to follow a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on a maritime law issue, the decisions of the lower federal courts may be viewed as merely persuasive authority. Since the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of a defendant’s right to trial by jury in a Jones Act case, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded it was at liberty to rule based on its own construction of the Jones Act. The Court further reasoned that the right to trial by jury is a matter of procedural law which should be governed by the law of the forum.
Learning Point:
Where a Jones Act seaman elects to sue his employer for negligence and/or unseaworthiness in Illinois State court, the defendant may elect to have a trial by jury even if the plaintiff does not. Bowman is contrary to well established admiralty law precedent. Therefore, it is unknown whether other State courts will view it as persuasive authority. In Bowman, there is no indication that counsel for the parties addressed the principles of federalism, the Admiralty Clause of the Constitution or the wealth of authority upholding the principles of the uniformity of admiralty law in both State and federal court cases. In a case involving admiralty jurisdiction and/or the application of admiralty law, Bowman highlights the need to retain experienced admiralty counsel to ensure that the court is fully apprised of the rules of law and principles that should govern the action. This is particularly critical in courts that are not regularly called upon to hear admiralty cases. •
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