New Jersey Supreme Court Holds Intent Presumed for "Particularly Reprehensible" Conduct Such as Stabbing In Fight
February, 2002
The New Jersey Supreme Court holds that where an insured’s conduct is particularly reprehensible, such as stabbing another person during a fight, intent may be presumed as a matter of law, without further inquiry into whether the insured intended to cause the actual injury that resulted. Even absent such exceptional circumstances, further inquiry may still be unnecessary if the actual injury inflicted was an inherently probable consequence of the insured’s conduct. Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Garitta, 785 A.2d 913 (N.J.).
Facts
On September 15, 1996, David Garitta and five of his friends, including Joseph Licata, were socializing at Garitta’s father house in Greentown, Pa. Around 1:15 a.m., Albert Sabatelli arrived at the house. Garitta and Sabatelli had been friends and Sabetelli’s mother was Garitta’s father’s girlfriend. However, some ill will had arisen as a result of the parents’ relationship, and the two men became involved in an altercation.
The fight eventually spilled outside. Sabatelli was unarmed. Garitta carried a knife and stabbed Sabatelli twice, puncturing his heart and stomach. The record indicated that Sabatelli had removed his shirt prior to going outside; his lack of clothing enhanced the ability of the knife to puncture the flesh, thus intensifying his injuries. Garitta testified that he did not go outside with the intention of killing Sabatelli, nor did he want to hurt or stab Sabatelli; he had hoped to persuade him to leave the premises. Garitta further testified that he was not aiming to stab Sabatelli in “a vital part of his body” and that the two thrusts were close in time, “one right after the other, like really fast.” Sabatelli died as a result of his injuries.
Garitta was charged with criminal homicide under Pennsylvania law and ultimately plead guilty to third-degree murder. He was sentenced to five years in prison.
Sabatelli’s father subsequently filed a wrongful death action in New Jersey state court against Garitta, Garitta’s father and Licata. The complaint alleged that Garitta and Licata “instigated” the fight in which Sabatelli was “attacked and assaulted.” The complaint further alleged that Garitta’s “recklessness, negligence and carelessness . . . consisted of his use of a weapon without due regard to the dangerousness of said weapon or concern for the potential consequences, and his failure to recognize the danger presented by the introduction of the weapon into the altercation.”
Harleysville filed a declaratory judgment action in New Jersey state court seeking a declaration that the homeowner’s policy it issued to Garitta’s father did not provide coverage for his son’s conduct. The trial court granted the insurer summary judgment, concluding that Garitta’s actions fell within the policy’s provision excluding coverage for “‘bodily injury’ . . . which is expected or intended by the insured.’”
The appellate court reversed, concluding that the circumstances of the stabbing, together with Garitta’s intent or expectation in wielding the knife that killed Sabatelli, were sufficiently unclear so as to require a trial. Harleysville petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for review.
Analysis
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that as a general rule, courts should ordinarily refrain from entering summary judgment concerning whether an insured intended or expected to cause the actual injury to a third party unless the record “undisputedly demonstrates that such injury was an inherently probable consequence of the insured’s conduct.” In that latter circumstance, a trial may not be necessary to determine the applicability of the exclusion, provided that there has been a “sufficient demonstration of the insured’s subjective intent to cause some degree of injury.” “When the insured’s conduct is particularly reprehensible, courts may presume an intent to injure without inquiring into the actor’s actual intent,” the Court wrote.
Applying these tenets, the Court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Harleysville. It noted that the undisputed facts indicated that Garitta left the house with a knife hidden in the back of his pants and met Sabatelli, who was unarmed. Shortly before the encounter Garitta was urged by Licata to “cut” Sabatelli. Garitta then thrust the knife into Sabatelli’s bare torso, twice. Further, Garitta acknowledged those acts, stating that the thrusts were close in time, “one right after the other[.]” The Court explained that Garitta’s intent to injure was presumed as a matter of law on these facts:
[u]nder those circumstances, a trier of fact need not determine [Garitta’s] actual intent. The insurer has demonstrated that the insured intended to cause some injury, and that the actual injury that led to [Sabatelli’s] death was an inherently probable consequence of the insured’s action. Thus the trial court properly determined the insured’s intention or expectation within the meaning of the exclusionary clause, as a matter of law. Consistent with SL Industries and Voorhees, no further factual inquiry is necessary to resolve this dispute.
The court rejected the insured’s arguments that Garitta’s plea arrangement in Pennsylvania evinces that he did not possess the specific intent to kill Sabatelli. The Court also rejected the argument that allegations of “recklessness, negligence and carelessness” contained in the wrongful death complaint triggered a duty defend Garitta:
For purposes of the exclusion . . . we are persuaded that the gravamen of the
wrongful death action from [Garitta’s] standpoint is that a single course of conduct resulted in liability...For our limited purposes . . . we view the insured’s conduct to be a single act comprised of both the taking and thrusting of the knife into the victim. Because the probable consequences of that act inhere from the act itself, there is no coverage.
Learning Point:
Following Harleysville, the insured’s undisputed use of a potentially lethal weapon such as a knife or a gun to stab or shoot another person during a fight should entitle a liability insurer to summary judgment in a coverage case involving the expected/intended exclusion. What other types of “particularly reprehensible” conduct will be deemed to warrant presumption of intent to injure as a matter of law remains to be seen.
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