Seventh Circuit Proposes Better Test For Admiralty Jurisdiction But Applies Extension Of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act
October, 2006
In Tagliere v. Harrah’s Illinois Corp., 445 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit was called upon to decide whether a personal injury claim involving a casino boat patron’s fall from a slot machine stool fell within its admiralty jurisdiction or whether it would be governed by Illinois tort law and accordingly be time barred. Before undertaking its analysis of the jurisdictional issue, the Court noted:
The accident in our case had nothing to do with the fact that the casino was on a boat afloat on a navigable stream rather than sitting on dry land. And so whatever distinctive rules of liability admiralty courts have developed would be no better suited, and perhaps would be worse suited, to the resolution of this accident case than ordinary state tort law would be. There is, therefore, common-sense appeal to the district court’s ruling that the suit is not within the admiralty jurisdiction.
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But the most important requirement of a jurisdictional rule is not that it appeal to common sense but that it be clear.
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard A. Posner proposed that the existence of admiralty jurisdiction in each case be decided on the basis of “whether admiralty law or state law would make a better fit with the particular circumstances of the accident that had given rise to the suit.” He acknowledged, however, that this approach “would make the determination of jurisdiction hopelessly uncertain. It is not a price worth paying for the slightly better match of law to fact that would result.”
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit applied the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 740, which extends admiralty jurisdiction to “all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water.” The Court stated that the Act:
provides a clear and simple jurisdictional test for cases like this, in contrast to the vague ‘maritime nexus’ (or ‘connection’) test [where] ‘the party seeking to invoke maritime jurisdiction must show a substantial relationship between the activity giving rise to the incident and traditional maritime activity,’ Sisson v. Ruby [497 U.S. 358, 364, 1990 AMC 1801 (1990)], that is used to determine jurisdiction under Section 1331(1), which confers but does not define admiralty jurisdiction.
Applying the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of admiralty jurisdiction where it had not been shown that the casino boat was permanently, rather than merely indefinitely moored when the accident occurred. In Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 41, 2005 AMC 609 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a “vessel” is any craft practically capable of transportation over water. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, after Stewart, the casino boat would have to be permanently incapacitated from sailing in order for it to no longer be a “vessel” for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, if the Tagliere casino boat is found to be only indefinitely moored, the slot machine accident will fall within admiralty jurisdiction.
Learning Point:
Tagliere reflects a judicial desire for a simpler test for admiralty jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit indicated that it viewed the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act as an independent basis of federal jurisdiction “which provides a clear and simple jurisdictional test” and chose to apply the Act instead of the Sisson v. Ruby test. Courts following Tagliere may take a sweeping view of admiralty jurisdiction and extend it to include anything done on navigable waters by a vessel, her crew, her passengers, or by others to them, regardless of whether the incident has any connection to traditional maritime activity. It remains to be seen whether the admiralty courts will trend toward this expansive view of jurisdiction.
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