Jones Act Not a Bar to Employer's Suit Against Seaman for Property Damage
February, 2006
by Kimbley A. Kearney and
In Withhart v. Otto Candies, L.L.C., 431 F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit, in a case of first impression in the federal courts, held that a shipowner-employer may assert causes of action for negligence and indemnity against a seaman-employee for property damage caused by the seaman-employee’s negligence.
Facts
Sea Mar employed Withhart as a mate aboard its vessel, which was involved in a collision with a vessel operated by Otto Candies. Withhart was injured and sued Sea Mar for negligence under the Jones Act, 45 U.S.C. App. § 688, and for unseaworthiness under the general maritime law. Otto Candies sued Sea Mar for damages to its vessel caused by the collision. Sea Mar counterclaimed against Withhart for negligence to recover damages to its vessel and for indemnity to recoup the money it paid Otto Candies to settle Otto Candies’ property damage claim. Sea Mar alleged that Withhart was on watch and in command of the vessel when he negligently left the wheelhouse of the vessel in congested waters to attend to “personal business.” In his absence, the collision occurred.
Analysis
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed Sea Mar’s negligence and indemnity claims against Withhart, but allowed Sea Mar to take an interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit, which accepted the appeal and reversed. The Fifth Circuit held that Sea Mar’s action against Withhart is permissible and would be resolved in accordance with the general maritime law’s pure comparative fault scheme, articulated in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). Withhart argued that the Jones Act extends to seaman-employees the same rights granted to railway employees under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et. seq. (“FELA”), and that by enacting FELA, Congress rescinded an employer’s common law right to sue its FELA employees (and, by extension, Jones Act employees) for property damage. The Fifth Circuit found that the majority of courts, including every federal circuit court to have addressed this issue in a FELA case, have concluded to the contrary. Withhart, 431 F.3d at 843 (citing Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 729 F.2d 289, 284 (4th Cir. 1984)). The Fifth Circuit adopted the majority position. In doing so, it specifically rejected the proposition that allowing a Jones Act employer to sue a seaman for property damage would run afoul of Sections 5 and 10 of FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 55 and 60. These provisions prohibit an employer from employing any “device whatsoever” to either exempt itself from liability to a covered employee or to prevent an employee from voluntarily furnishing information about the facts of an accident. The court reasoned that Section 5 of FELA was intended by Congress to prohibit an employer from avoiding liability to others for the negligence of its employees. It further reasoned that allowing a FELA or Jones Act employer to sue an employee for property damage would not likely cause other parties to be reluctant to voluntarily furnish information about the incident giving rise to the damage.
For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit held “that no statutory provision in the FELA, and consequently in the Jones Act, prohibits a shipowner-employer from pursuing a claim against its negligent seaman-employee for property damage.” The court rejected the notion that permitting an employer to assert a claim for negligence and indemnity against a seaman contravenes the “‘Jones Act purpose of facilitating compensation to injured seaman’” and concluded that “permitting a shipowner-employer to sue its seaman-employee for property damage arising out of the seaman-employee’s negligence will not narrow the remedies available to seamen-employees under the Jones Act.”
Learning Point:
In the event that a Jones Act employer sustains property damage as a result of the negligence of its employee, or faces liability to a third-party (other than another Jones Act employee) on account of the negligence of a seaman, the employer may now seek redress against the seaman on the authority of Withhart. The degree of the seaman’s negligence, and consequently the extent to which he may be liable to his employer, will be determined on the basis of pure comparative fault. •
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