Appeals Court Rejects Stacking for Underinsured Policy Limits

By Don R. Sampen, published, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, May 19, 2026

The 1st District Appellate Court recently held that an auto policy covering 17 vehicles and listing underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage of $50,000 for each vehicle did not allow the aggregation or “stacking” of those limits so as to provide coverage in the aggregated amount.

The case is Stonegate Insurance Co. v. Gonzo’s Enterprises, Inc., 2026 IL App (1st) 242355-U (March 24). The insurer, Stonegate, was represented by Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP of Chicago. Leslie J. Rosen of Chicago represented the insured driver, William Robert Bartlett, and Gonzo’s.

Bartlett was injured in 2020 while driving a car owned by Gonzo’s Enterprises Inc. Gonzo’s had an auto policy issued by Stonegate that covered 17 cars and 16 drivers, including Bartlett. His medical bills from the accident totaled almost $1 million, and the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident had only $50,000 in coverage. Bartlett ended up settling with the other driver for that driver’s $50,000 policy limit and then seeking UIM coverage under the Stonegate policy.

The Stonegate policy insured each of the 17 vehicles for $50,000 in UIM coverage and listed that amount in the declarations pages for each vehicle. The declarations further stated that the amount of UIM coverage shown “for any one vehicle” was the most Stonegate would pay for damages from any one accident, regardless of the number of vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations.

A UIM endorsement to the policy also stated that the limit of liability shown in the declarations “for each person” was the limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one accident.

Despite these provisions, Bartlett claimed he was entitled to stack the UIM limits for all 17 vehicles and thus recover upwards of $850,000 in UIM coverage. Stonegate took the position that the maximum available coverage was $50,000, and since the other vehicle already paid $50,000, no UIM coverage was available under the Stonegate policy.

Stonegate filed this declaratory action and, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, received a judgment in its favor. Bartlett and Gonzo’s appealed.

Analysis

In a decision by Justice Margaret Stanton McBride, the 1st District affirmed. She began by observing that stacking involves the combining of policy limits applicable to more than one vehicle where the other vehicles are not involved in the accident.

The issue may arise in the context of UIM coverage because it typically applies regardless of the vehicle in which the insured person is riding.

In addition, its purpose is to place the insured in the position he or she would have been in if the tortfeasor had adequate coverage, and the coverage is required by statute for each vehicle. McBride further noted, however, that anti-stacking language is authorized by statute.

Bartlett argued on appeal, among other things, that the Stonegate policy lacked “specific” language referring to “no stacking” or “no aggregation.” He further contended that the endorsement’s reference to “each person” meant that the limits were to be added for each person and the phrasing made the declarations language ambiguous.

McBride rejected these positions by observing that no “magic language” was necessary to bar stacking and that Bartlett failed to cite relevant authority in connection with his specificity argument.

Bartlett further relied on dictum from Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179 (1993), in which the Supreme Court hypothesized that “it would not be difficult to find an ambiguity” — thereby allowing stacking — in an insurance policy covering multiple vehicles depending on the format used in the policy to list the coverage.

McBride observed, however, that Bruder set forth no per se rule that each policy had to be considered as a whole and the manner in which each vehicle was listed, and that the mere listing of coverage amounts multiple times was not decisive. In this case, moreover, an anti-stacking clause appeared in both the declarations and the UIM endorsement, and there was no ambiguity.

Bartlett also relied on several cases from the 5th District Appellate Court allowing stacking, which McBride distinguished on several grounds. Among them was the fact that those cases did not involve the same kind of anti-stacking language used in the Stonegate policy, which McBride referred to as a “belt and suspenders approach.”

The 1st District therefore affirmed the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Stonegate.

Key Point

Language limiting underinsured coverage in an automobile insurance policy to the limit available “for any one vehicle” or for “each person” in “each accident” may be effective in preventing the stacking of policy limits.