Unsettled Facts Over Road Rage Run-in Bars Summary Judgment

By Don R. Sampen, published, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, May 20, 2025

The 1st District Appellate Court, reversing the trial court, recently held that circumstances involving an insured who was injured after he left his car during an alleged road rage incident were sufficiently unclear to decide coverage for the injury, despite the parties’ apparent agreement on key facts.

The case is Ahlgren v. Stonegate Insurance Co., 2025 IL App (1st) 240905 (April 8). The insured, Michael Ahlgren, was represented by Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney of Chicago. Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP of Chicago represented the insurer, Stonegate.

Ahlgren, who was driving a truck, claimed that another driver, Saul Garcia, threw objects at Ahlgren both while driving and when stopped at a traffic light. Both subsequently pulled into a parking lot, and Ahlgren exited his truck, without turning off the ignition and started walking toward Garcia. Ahlgren testified at his deposition he was trying to look at Garcia’s license plate.

Garcia, however, testified Ahlgren ran toward him with what he thought was a weapon, which caused Garcia to panic, step on the gas, and strike Ahlgren with his vehicle. Garcia was later arrested and pleaded guilty to battery.

Stonegate’s policy covered Ahlgren’s truck and provided that an “insured” under the policy was anyone “using with your permission a covered auto you own.” Since Ahlgren owned the truck, he sought coverage for his injuries under the policy’s uninsured motorist endorsement. Stonegate took the position Ahlgren was not “using” the vehicle at the time of the road rage incident.

The trial court granted Ahlgren’s summary judgment motion for coverage, finding that the facts were “undisputed” and that the injury arose out of Ahlgren’s use of the truck. Stonegate then appealed.

Analysis

In an opinion by Justice Rena M. Van Tine, the 1st District reversed. She observed initially that the only coverage issue was whether Ahlgren was “using” his truck at the time of the incident — whether, under Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 237 Ill. 2d 391 (2010), the truck was being used in a manner “rationally connected to the vehicle for the purpose of providing transportation or satisfying some other related need of the user.”

Van Tine noted a small body of cases analyzing “use” of a vehicle for purposes of insurance coverage, but that most of them concerned the loading and unloading of cargo or passengers. Some related cases addressed whether the claimants were “occupying” the vehicle at the time an incident, not whether they were actually “using” it.

She stated, however, that she had found no case addressing whether a driver “uses” a vehicle when stopping and exiting a vehicle to obtain the license plate number or attempting to confront the driver of another vehicle with which the driver just had a road-rage-like incident.

In this case, moreover, the two drivers had different stories. Ahlgren testified he was merely trying to get Garcia’s license plate number, while Garcia testified Ahlgren was coming at him in a threatening manner.

Under Ahlgren’s version of the facts, Van Tine wrote, a fact finder might determine he had briefly exited his vehicle for a purpose connected to transportation-related needs, akin to motorists pulling to the side of the road to exchange insurance information. But under Garcia’s version, a fact finder could find that a driver leaving his vehicle to start a physical confrontation with another driver was not rationally connected to transportation needs.

Curiously, the parties appeared to agree to one set of facts based on Ahlgren’s version of the facts, for summary judgment purposes. Van Tine found, however, that the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment did not mean there were no disputed facts. Nor could she ignore Garcia’s conflicting deposition testimony since it was of record in the case.

She concluded that the parties could not force the case into being amenable to resolution by summary judgment even if that was what the parties preferred.

The court therefore reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Key Points

• Road rage incidents resulting in injury to an insured may or may not give rise to uninsured motorist coverage depending on, among other factors, whether the insured was an aggressor during the incident.

• Parties’ agreement to a set of facts will not necessarily lead to summary judgment when other facts of record give rise to factual issues.