Second DCA Determined Trial Court Wrongfully Determined Insurer Presented No Evidence Supporting a Verdict In Insurer’s Favor That It Paid The Prevailing Competitive Price To Replace a Windshield

By Darrel A. Limia

In GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Auto Glass of Tampa Bay, Inc. As Assignee of Matthew Dick, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal held the trial court erred vacating the jury’s verdict in GEICO’s favor and granting Superior’s motion for judgment following the Court’s directed verdict.

This matter involved a lawsuit brought by Superior, pursuant to an assignment of benefits from GEICO’s insured, to replace a windshield. Superior replaced the windshield of the Insured’s car and invoiced GEICO for the replacement. At trial, Superior argued its charge was 100% of the recommended amount by the National Auto Glass Specifications (NAGS) and is the prevailing competitive price. GEICO also utilized NAGS, but testified it routinely pays 50% of the recommended NAGS amount. GEICO argued it paid the prevailing competitive price per its policy that states GEICO’s liability is limited to the prevailing competitive price GEICO can secure from a competent and conveniently located repair facility.

Pursuant to prior rulings from the Circuit Court sitting in its appellate capacity, GEICO attempted to introduce evidence of the amount it paid nonnetwork shops – shops that are out of GEICO’s insurance network. GEICO attempted to present a claims history spreadsheet containing other claims from the same year, limited to nonnetwork shops, showing the amount billed by the shop and the amount paid by GEICO. This spreadsheet was excluded from evidence by the trial court. Additionally, GEICO provided testimony that it could secure a price from other nonnetwork repair shops for the same amount paid to Superior, further providing testimony showing the nonnetwork repair shops were competent. The jury returned a verdict for GEICO. However, the trial court subsequently granted Superior’s Motion to Set Aside Verdict, granting a directed verdict for Superior, concluding that GEICO presented no admissible evidence upon which the jury could rely to find that GEICO paid the prevailing competitive price.

On appeal, the Second DCA agreed with GEICO that, per the plain language of the policy, the prevailing competitive price is the price that GEICO can secure. The trial court’s conclusion that there was no evidence of open-market, competitive transactions because GEICO limited its evidence to that of its own claims on its own pricing parameters was incorrect, and further abused its discretion in excluding the spreadsheet. The Second DCA further suggests that the limitation the circuit appellate court placed on GEICO in this case, limiting prices to nonnetwork pricing, was incorrect because the policy doesn’t contain such a restriction but that the Second DCA was bound by that prior decision. Additionally, the Second DCA held that GEICO’s testimony that the lack of dissatisfactory responses from surveys and lack of multiple replacements on the same claim sufficiently indicated that the nonnetwork repairs shops were competent. The Second DCA held that, in assessing the evidence in the light most favorable to GEICO and considering all reasonable inferences in its favor, there was sufficient admissible evidence to support a verdict that the entities from which GEICO was able to secure a price within the parameters is paid Superior were “competent” repair facilities, and that GEICO established it paid Superior the prevailing competitive price. As a result, the Second DCA reversed the trial court’s final judgment, and remanded the matter for entry of judgment in favor of GEICO per the jury’s verdict.